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I present an immanent, and explanatory, critique of reflections on the nature of 
politics and of power within political science. I argue that these reflections are 
problematic, to the extent that they presuppose an actualist conception of the 
political, and that this is generated by an empiricist way of thinking on the one hand 
and a constructivist way of thinking on the other. I show how re-defining politics, 
power, and the political on the basis of a dialectical critical realist ontology resolves 
these problems and, thereby, allows us to understand the conditions for social 
change and the relationship between the political and the economic. My argument 
has two, important implications: first, that the proposal that those who study politics 
professionally should celebrate philosophical diversity is dangerous–at least if it 
makes it difficult to sustain a distinct, emancipatory form of political inquiry; and, 
second, that the nature of social reality justifies the need both for specialized forms 
of inquiry, such as politics and economics, and integrative forms of inquiry, such as 
political economy.  
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The Nature of the Political Reconsidered1 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the nature of the political? My aim in this article is to provide an answer to 
this question by examining, critically, political scientists’ reflections on the nature of 
politics and of power. What appears to be motivating these reflections is a concern 
that those who study politics professionally lack a secure disciplinary identity. Both 
Hay and the Executive Council of the European Political Science Network have 
expressed this concern: 
For, what kind of discipline, we might ask, lacks a clear sense of its 
terrain of inquiry and the means to adjudicate contending accounts of 
what occurs within that domain? (Hay, 2002, p. 60)  
We cannot talk about political science as a discipline if those who call 
themselves political scientists and pretend to teach it are unable to 
agree on its basic substance and methodology. (Executive Council of 
the European Political Science Network, as cited in Burnham, Gilland 
Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008, pp. 9–10) 
However, despite having reflected on the nature of politics and of power, political 
scientists appear to be divided still over the question of what is the “basic substance” 
of political science. Indeed, it would seem that, in Britain at least, the debate has 
become polarized between those who define politics as an “arena” and those define 
it as a “process” (Leftwich, 2004a); given the “political” nature of this debate, Leftwich 
(2004a) concludes that it is unlikely that political scientists will agree completely “on 
either what politics, as an activity, is or what the appropriate composition of the 
discipline of Politics should be” (p. 2). 
 One way of responding to this situation is to argue, as Stoker and Marsh 
(2010) do, that “both arena and process definitions have their value” (p. 8). However, 
this sort of argument leaves the dichotomy between the two types of definition intact 
and thereby takes us back to the original problem of how to secure a coherent 
professional identity for political scientists.  
A second way of responding to this situation is to argue that, despite the 
dichotomy between the arena and process definitions of politics, what political 
scientists have in common is a concern with the study of power. Again, Stoker and 
Marsh (2010) present this alternative type of argument when claiming that politics is 
“a struggle over power” (p. 8), as does Leftwich (2004a) when identifying the 
“collective concern with the analysis of the origins, forms, distribution and control of 
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power” as the “common ground” among political scientists (p. 2). However, to claim 
that the study of power can be the common concern of political scientists is to 
displace, once again, the initial problem of lack of agreement; for, as both Stoker and 
Marsh, and Leftwich, acknowledge, political scientists are also in conflict over the 
nature of power.  
 A third type of response is to deny that there is any significant disagreement 
over the conceptualization of politics and to reduce the level of disagreement from 
the ontological to the methodological, as when Leftwich (2004a) claims that “the main 
differences in approach [to the definition of politics]” reflect primarily “explanatory 
differences about how politics … is to be analysed, understood and taught” (p. 2). 
Yet, if ontology is inexorable, so that questions of methodology presuppose 
questions of epistemology and ontology, not to reflect on the nature of politics is to 
work implicitly with a conception of politics; that is, to analyse, understand, and teach 
politics is to presuppose a conception of politics and the political whether one is 
aware of this or not.  
 The value of reflecting on the British debate about the nature of political 
science is that it is instructive of the consequences of failing to sustain a coherent 
conception of an object of social scientific inquiry. In this article I argue that the failure 
to sustain a coherent conception of the object of political scientific inquiry has three 
consequences. First, it undermines attempts to produce integrative, interdisciplinary 
research because it makes it impossible to understand how the political is connected 
to other specialized objects of social scientific inquiry.  Second, it undermines the 
intellectual justification for the existence of a distinct domain of political scientific 
inquiry and, in consequence, makes it difficult for political scientists to justify the 
continuing public funding of political science. Third, it obscures our understanding of 
the existence, source, and nature of power in the social realm, which is an essential 
condition for the transformation of social structures and the eradication of sources of 
oppression. The first and second consequences may be generalized to other social 
sciences, though, because philosophical incoherence will undermine the 
understanding of the ontological basis for scientific integration and specialization 
whatever is the object of inquiry. However, even the third consequence is not unique 
to political scientists because, to the extent that other social scientists, such as 
sociologists, who are concerned with understanding the connections between 
different social structures, take for granted the knowledge that political scientists 
develop about the existence, source, and nature of power, the failure to sustain a 
coherent conception of the political will have implications for their understanding of 
how to transform social systems. In short, without a satisfactory answer to the 
question of what is the “basic substance” of political science, social scientists in 
general–not just political scientists–will find it difficult to understand how the political 
is both distinct from the objects of inquiry of the other specialized social sciences yet 
at the same time connected to them, and to understand how political, and social, 
science can be emancipatory. 
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 My argument is organized as follows. In the first section I clarify the basic 
contours of the debate about the nature of politics, using the classification of 
approaches to defining politics developed by Leftwich (2004a), and argue by means 
of immanent critique that, for as long as they take for granted an actualist conception 
of the political, participants in this debate will fail to reach agreement on the nature of 
politics. In the second section I turn to questions of power. Here I focus on the debate 
between Hay (1997) and Doyle (1998) and show–again, by means of immanent 
critique–that both Hay’s and Doyle’s revised conception of power is problematic, to 
the extent that it retains an implicit commitment to an actualist ontology. In the third 
section I show how re-defining politics and power on the basis of a dialectical critical 
realist ontology resolves the actualist problematic and helps us to understand, first, 
the conditions for social change and, second, how the political is both distinct from, 
yet connected to, the economic. In the fourth and final section I offer some 
concluding thoughts about the problem of securing a coherent disciplinary identity for 
political scientists in light of the preceding argument. 
 Throughout the article I identify political scientists’ implicit conceptions of the 
political. I proceed in this way because, as Lawson (2004) has argued, questions of 
social scientific ontology presuppose questions of social philosophical ontology. 
Hence, problems at the level of scientific ontology have to be resolved by returning to 
the level of philosophical ontology. This is what the method of immanent critique 
enables me to do. However, I also try to show what is generating an actualist 
conception of the political and, to this extent, I move beyond the realm of immanent 
critique into the realm of explanatory critique.2 I argue that it is an empiricist and a 
constructivist way of thinking that is generating an actualist ontology. Of course, by 
showing the extent to which existing conceptions of politics and of power are false (in 
presupposing an actualist ontology3) and by identifying the (intellectual) conditions for 
this falsity–that is, empiricist and constructivist ways of thinking–I am placing a 
negative valuation on those forms of thought which are causing the false 
understanding of politics and of power and a positive valuation on a dialectical critical 
realist ontology, because it is only on the basis of the latter ontology that it is possible 
to develop conceptions of politics and of power that are less problematic and thereby 
more consistent with practice. Hence, my explanation logically entails action directed 
at eradicating actualist ways of thinking in social science. 
 
POLITICS AS ARENA AND PROCESS 
Let me begin, then, by examining the arena and process definitions of politics. To 
define politics as an arena is to tell us the “place or institutional forum” in which 
politics takes place (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 13); because this “place or institutional 
forum” is usually taken to be that of formal government, politics as an arena is 
characteristically associated with the realm of public politics. By contrast, to define 
politics as a process is to treat it as a universal phenomenon “occurring pervasively 
in a much wider range of institutions, activities and groups” (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 14); 
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in other words, as a general process politics occurs not only in the formal public 
domain but also in the informal, private one. 
 One might think, therefore, that the key difference between the arena and 
process definitions of politics turns on the range of applicability of the political: if the 
arena definition might be said to reflect a restrictive conception of the political, the 
process definition might be said to reflect an inclusive one. However, the first point I 
want to make is that the crucial difference between the two definitions is actually 
rather superficial because what both have in common is an implicit conception of the 
political as a particular type of human conduct or activity. For example, Peters (2004), 
adopting the arena approach, conceives of politics as a particular type of human 
activity–“making and implementing public policy”–that occurs in a particular place–“a 
set of institutions of government” (p. 25); and Nicholson (2004) asks “which human 
actions constitute ‘politics’” (p. 41) and argues that the human actions constituting 
politics are those associated with “the use or potential use of force by the 
government” (2004, p. 45). Similarly, those who define politics as a process 
presuppose a conception of the political as a particular type of human activity. 
Leftwich (2004b), for example, argues that politics “is a universal and pervasive 
aspect of human behaviour” which “comprises all the activities of co-operation, 
negotiation and conflict … whereby people go about organizing the use, production 
or distribution of human, natural and other resources” (pp. 100–103). Weale (1984), 
too, claims that politics is about the process of decision making that rational 
individuals engage in when faced with a problem of collective choice–a problem that 
may arise in “the whole range of human institutions” (p. 51)–while Hay (2007) sets 
out a “differentiated yet inclusive conception of politics” in which the defining activities 
are those of “choice,” “deliberation” and “social interaction” (pp. 65–70).  
 Now, to the extent that current arguments about the nature of politics are 
simply about which human activities are to be classified as political, they are 
superficial because, given their circular nature, they cannot be resolved: that is, an 
attempt to limit the definition of politics to one particular activity or set of activities can 
always be challenged by one that is less limiting, and vice versa. For example, when 
Peters (2004) argues that politics is about the decisions that governments make, 
because these are binding on the whole of society in a way that the decisions made 
by family members are not, he does so by appealing to “relations of power and 
influence between states and their societies” (p. 25)–an argument that feminists have 
challenged on the grounds that the “relations of power” that Peters invokes also exist 
within the family, marriage, and a wide range of other institutions not associated with 
the activities of public government (Squires, 2004). However, the more inclusive 
definition of politics that feminists have put forward may be challenged in turn. For 
example, when Nicholson (2004) sets out the case for limiting the definition of politics 
to decisions backed by force, he does so on the basis of a critique of definitions 
rooted in activities such as “disagreement, conflict and their resolution,” “government 
or governance,” and “the making of decisions”–that is, definitions that, in his view, 
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include too much: respectively, “cases of conflict which are nothing to do with 
politics,” “government and governance” pertaining to “schools and banks,” and “non-
political decisions made by groups and individuals” (p. 44). He claims that this 
definition is not too exclusive because it “satisfies the requirement … that no cases of 
politics be excluded on moral grounds” (p. 48). However, in excluding from 
consideration those organizations in which force should not play a role but in actual 
practice does play a role, is not Nicholson excluding cases of politics on moral 
grounds? Surely, if force is used in such contexts–whether or not this is legitimate–
that is a reason for bringing them into the domain of political inquiry? 
 If it is circular reasoning that makes the conflict between the arena- and 
process-based definitions of politics superficial, we should perhaps designate them 
“dialectical antagonists,” whose “tacit complicity”–that is, the common acceptance of 
a conception of the political as a type of human activity–makes them, at the same 
time, “dialectical counterparts” (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 88). I suggest that what is 
generating this antagonism is the influence of empiricist and constructivist ways of 
thinking. On the one hand it is an empiricist way of thinking that generates the arena 
approach because it is in the arenas of politics that we may observe human activities 
and it is what is observable that, in empiricism, defines the nature of, and limit to, our 
knowledge of the political. On the other hand it is a constructivist way of thinking that 
generates the process approach because it is through the processes of social 
interaction that human agents create or construct the political. In other words, from a 
constructivist perspective it is what is meaningful that defines the nature of, and limit 
to, our knowledge of the political; because people can construct different meanings of 
the political, politics cannot be limited to one type of context (for example, that of 
formal government). In short, if what the arena- and process-led approaches to 
defining politics have in common is that they presuppose a conception of the political 
as a particular type of human activity, where they differ is that in the former approach 
it is assumed that political activity is simply given to us immediately in experience–
that is, it is a taken-for-granted fact–whereas in the latter approach it is assumed that 
political activity has to be understood–that is, it is a socially constructed fact. What 
this means is that the tacit complicity of both approaches is their shared acceptance 
of an actualist ontology; for in both approaches it is assumed that causal powers and 
liabilities are always actualized. Yet, to assume that the effects of causal powers and 
liabilities are always actualized is to deny that the effect of a causal power or liability, 
when in exercise, can remain unactualized owing to the countervailing effects of 
other causal powers and liabilities. In other words, it is to deny that social structures, 
as emergent entities, are real–that reality is stratified; and, in the same moment, it is 
to deny that causal mechanisms of different types operate conjointly–that reality is 
differentiated.4 Hence, the epistemological positions of empiricism and constructivism 
rest on a fallacy–the “epistemic-ontic fallacy” (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 397); that is, they 
assume, simultaneously and erroneously, that the nature of our knowledge 
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determines the nature of reality (the epistemic fallacy) and that the nature of reality 
determines the nature of our knowledge (the ontic fallacy).5  
An empiricist way of thinking presupposes the empirical form of the epistemic-
ontic fallacy because the empiricist assumes, explicitly, that the foundation of 
knowledge is observation and thereby assumes, implicitly, that only observable 
objects exist. These assumptions are fallacious because from a transcendental 
realist perspective knowledge is the product of human reasoning as well as 
observation–that is, it is produced through the exercise of our powers of intentionality 
and reflexivity–and because observable objects constitute only one part of reality, the 
domain of the empirical. By contrast, a constructivist way of thinking presupposes the 
conceptual form of the fallacy because the constructivist assumes, explicitly, that the 
foundation of knowledge is human understanding and thereby assumes, implicitly, 
that reality is constituted through our ideas. Again, from a transcendental realist 
perspective these assumptions are fallacious because the production of knowledge 
involves the exercise of our power of observation as well as our powers of 
intentionality and reflexivity, and because ideas constitute only one part of reality, the 
domain of the conceptual.6  
 However, the underlying philosophical context of both approaches to defining 
politics is more complex than one of simple, dialectical antagonism because in both 
approaches the effect of a transcendental realist way of thinking is evident in the 
critique of the opposing definition of politics. For example, when defending a 
conception of politics rooted in the activities of formal government, Peters (2004) 
starts by telling us that “‘politics’ … refers fundamentally to the relations of power and 
influence between states and their societies” (p. 25). I suggest that, when referring to 
“relations of power and influence,” Peters is referring implicitly to a feature of social 
reality that is not given immediately in experience; that is, he is thinking of the power 
that governments have to change the rules conditioning social interaction in a way 
that affects everyone in society–a power whose existence is revealed through the 
passing of new legislation by Parliament and its enforcement in courts of law. 
However, Peters’ implicit conception of the political as an unobservable, non-actual, 
yet real object of social inquiry stands in tension with his implicit conception of the 
political as a particular type of observable human activity.7 The same sort of 
contradiction is evident in the work of Nicholson (2004), who argues that definitions 
of politics based on “class struggle” and “reaching decisions through rational 
discussion and argument” exclude too much that ought to be included within the 
domain of political inquiry–that is, societies not characterized by class conflict and 
societies not governed through representative democracy (pp. 42–44). But, I suggest 
that, in making this critique, Nicholson is operating–as Peters does–with an implicit 
conception of power as an unobservable, non-actual, yet real object of inquiry–a 
conception whose existence is revealed through, but cannot be reduced to, 
governments’ exercise of force. In short, in both Peters’ and Nicholson’s accounts of 
politics we can detect the dual, contradictory influences of actualist and 
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transcendental realist ways of thinking–with perhaps the influence of the former being 
much stronger than that of the latter. 
 One may also detect the influence of a transcendental realist way of thinking 
in process-led approaches to defining politics. For example, the emphasis on process 
and social interaction in Leftwich’s account, which betrays the influence of 
constructivist thinking, often sits alongside–indeed, is conflated with–an emphasis on 
power relations. Thus, Leftwich (2004b) tells us that all social contexts reflect “a 
particular pattern of interaction between people, resources – and power” (p. 101); 
that the activities constituting politics “everywhere both influence and reflect the 
distribution of power, the structure of social organization and the institutions of culture 
and ideology in a society” (p. 103); and that politics is “constituted by those universal 
interactions of people, resources and power in the pursuit of desired ends” (p. 107). 
Elsewhere in the same work, his emphasis on power relations, social structure, 
culture, and ideology is more explicit–for example, when he tells us that “a concern 
with power … is the distinctive and defining focus of the discipline of Politics” (p. 
110); that “relations of power are an intimate condition of the relations of people” (p. 
111); and that social contexts “constitute the relations of power and are normally 
sustained and legitimated by associated institutions of social organization, culture 
and ideology” (p. 114). I suggest that the continual references to relations of power, 
social institutions, culture, and ideology in Leftwich’s account attest to the influence of 
a transcendental realist way of thinking; indeed, the fact that power appears to be 
such an important aspect of his argument suggests that this way of thinking has had 
a much stronger effect than it has had for either Peters or Nicholson.  
 Therefore, the second point arising from my immanent critique of arena- and 
process-based definitions of politics is that, not only do these approaches, taken 
together, constitute a dialectical antagonism, grounded in a conception of the political 
as a type of human activity, but also that both approaches, when considered 
separately, are philosophically contradictory; that is, they betray the joint influence of 
actualist and transcendental realist ways of thinking. This is not surprising because it 
is by virtue of the implicit transcendental realist element in their thinking that theorists 
on both sides of the debate can develop critiques of one another. Process-led 
theorists can argue that to limit the definition of politics to activities associated with 
the arenas of formal government is to place an unjustified restriction on the domain of 
the political, because power relations are a feature of all types of social structure, not 
simply those associated with the making of public policy; and arena-led theorists can 
argue that the activities that process-led theorists choose as defining of politics 
constitute too broad a range, because not all such activities pertain to the way in 
which governments exercise power in society. 
 Consideration of the philosophical contradictions in the arena- and process-
based definitions of politics brings me to the third point of this section, which is that it 
is the continuing influence of empiricist and constructivist ways of thinking that is 
perpetuating a conception of the political as a type of human activity and that is 
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thereby blocking the emergence of a philosophically coherent conception of the 
political. One of the consequences of conceiving of the political as a type of human 
activity is that it leaves one unable to explain at a philosophical level how the political 
is both distinct from, yet at the same time connected to, the objects of inquiry of the 
other specialized social sciences. It is clear, for example, that Leftwich (2004b) 
understands, implicitly, that the political and the economic are both distinct from, yet 
connected to, one another when telling us that “many of the urgent problems facing 
the societies of the world” cannot be addressed by only one discipline (p. 105) and 
when advocating, in social science, “an interdisciplinary movement of evidence and 
explanation” (p. 117). The problem, though, is that political scientists such as 
Leftwich will not be able to develop integrative, interdisciplinary explanations for as 
long as they continue to conceive of the political as a particular type of human 
activity. As long as their thinking remains at the level of the actual, which is what their 
conception of the political as a type of human activity implies, they will not be able to 
decide which activities are political and which are economic–a decision which they 
must make if they are to develop integrative, interdisciplinary explanations of 
concrete phenomena. Of course, both arena and process theorists might claim that 
what is political is what is conventionally labelled political. However, this is not a 
solution to the problem because to re-classify human activities as political one must 
have reasons for doing so that are independent of the activities to be re-classified; 
otherwise, the re-classification becomes arbitrary and open to continual challenge. 
Hence, it is not surprising that political scientists such as Leftwich should have 
introduced–as an independent reason–a transcendental realist conception of power 
into their accounts of the nature of politics for this is the only way in which they can 
achieve greater consistency between their theory and practice. However, as we have 
seen, political scientists are hanging on to an actualist conception of the political, 
which is making their accounts of the nature of politics theoretically incoherent and 
thus less consistent with the practices of politics than if they had developed a 
transcendental realist conception of politics. If we are to develop a transcendental 
realist conception of politics, therefore, we will need to eradicate the actualist 
residues from political scientists’ ontological reflections. Let us now examine the 
debate within political science about the nature of power to see if political scientists 
have managed to move beyond an actualist ontology.  
 
POWER 
It is well known that the debate among political theorists about the nature of power 
has moved through various “dimensions” and “faces” with the publication of seminal 
works by Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963), and Lukes (1974). Along 
the way the debate has moved from an emphasis on the decisions taken amidst 
conflicts of interests, via an emphasis on the setting of decision-making agendas, to 
an emphasis on the shaping of interests. Hay (1997) has contributed to this debate 
by developing, in response to Lukes’ “radical view” of power, his own conception of 
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power as both “context-shaping” and “conduct-shaping” (p. 51)–a conception that, in 
his view, overcomes the weaknesses in Lukes’ account. One of the most crucial of 
these, argues Hay, is the retained commitment to a behaviouralist conception of 
power, which stems, in Hay’s view, from Lukes’ desire to challenge the assumption 
implicit in the work of Dahl, and Bachrach and Baratz, that human agents always 
know which courses of action are in their best interests. 
 However, close inspection of Hay’s argument reveals that his revised 
conception of power suffers from weaknesses of its own; for, despite claiming to 
have rejected the behaviouralist assumptions latent in Lukes’ conception of power, in 
proposing a conception of power as “conduct-shaping”–which is a “direct” form of 
power, according to Hay, because it reflects the immediate effect of one person’s 
choice of action on that of another person’s–Hay retains them.8 Indeed, Hay 
describes “direct power” as “immediate, visible and behavioural … manifest in such 
practices as decision-making, physical and psychological coercion, persuasion and 
blackmail” (p. 51). In other words, power as “conduct-shaping” is power that is always 
in exercise; but, if power is always in exercise, that brings us back to the irresolvable 
question of which human activities or forms of conduct constitute an exercise of 
power and which do not.  
 The implicit assumption that power is always in exercise is also a feature of 
the work of Doyle (1998). For example, when discussing what he calls the “third 
dimension” of power, Doyle gives us the example of the prisoner who, having been 
intimidated by the prison authorities, conceals his conflict with them when the prison 
inspectors show up. Doyle claims that a behaviouralist approach cannot deal with 
such a scenario because it cannot “penetrate the surface of social relations” (p. 52). 
Yet, because it retains an implicit commitment to an actualist and empiricist ontology, 
neither Lukes’ nor Doyle’s conception of power manages to “penetrate the surface of 
social relations” sufficiently deeply; for in Doyle’s example of the prisoner the 
decision to conceal the conflict is an actual event, just as a decision to reveal it (in 
different circumstances) would be. Equally, it is apparent from Doyle’s discussion of 
what he calls the “fourth dimension” of power that the existence of the power relation 
between A and B depends on the identification of a conflict of interest somewhere in 
the past–what Doyle calls “an historical B”–and the removal of that conflict by the 
action(s) of A. In other words, according to Doyle we know we are dealing with a 
power relation between A and B if we have identified–from an examination of 
“independent evidence”–the existence of, first, a conflict of interest between A and B 
and, second, an action by A to change the preferences of B, which, in Doyle’s 
example, is “manipulation.” If in the “third dimension,” then, there has to have been 
an observable conflict between A and B, in the “fourth dimension” there has to have 
been both an observable conflict and an action by A to secure “the contentment of 
B,” if we are to conclude that a power relation between A and B exists (pp. 53–55). 
Yet, this is to reduce an ontological question–about what is the nature of power–to an 
epistemological question–about what is the nature of our knowledge of power: it is to 
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make the existence of power dependent on the identification of an act of conflict 
and/or manipulation (the epistemic fallacy), which, in turn, is to reduce our knowledge 
of power to an observable human action (the ontic fallacy). In short, Doyle fails to 
break completely with the empiricist assumptions underpinning Lukes’ conception of 
power just as much as Hay fails to.  
 Now, whereas Hay’s conception of power as “conduct-shaping” is a “direct” 
form of power, his conception of power as “context-shaping” is “indirect” because it 
reflects the way in which one person can transform the rules of the game so as “to 
redefine the parameters of what is socially, politically and economically possible for 
others” (Hay, 1997, p. 50). What is significant about power as “context-shaping” is 
that it incorporates a conception of power as a “capacity” or “ability”; in this respect it 
moves beyond a purely behaviouralist conception of power because it points to the 
important distinction between the possession and exercise of power. Yet, to suggest 
that the “direct” form of power is a capacity, too, because the “ability to influence 
directly the actions and/or choices of another individual or group is but one special 
case of this more general capacity,” is contradictory; for, if “direct power” is a 
capacity, it need not always be in exercise–in which case it cannot also be 
“immediate, visible and behavioural” (Hay, 1997, p. 50). Therefore, the first point I 
want to make about power is that, by reducing it to the effects of its exercise (whether 
or not these effects are perceived), we deny the possibility that power may be 
possessed yet remain unexercised and that it may be exercised yet remain 
unactualized (owing to the countervailing effects of other powers when in exercise); 
and in denying these possibilities we run the risk of concluding–erroneously–that, just 
because we cannot observe the expected effects of the exercise of power (whether 
this is conflict or some other form of human interaction), it does not exist. In short, a 
behaviouralist conception of power is likely to mislead us as to the true existence of 
power in society and, to the extent that it does so, may thereby help to subvert 
challenges to the unequal distribution of power in society. 
 But, even if we accept the possibility that power may be possessed yet remain 
unexercised, we can still be confused about the source or location of power–as Hay 
(1997) also appears to be when setting out his conception of power as “context-
shaping.” The philosophical problem here is two-fold. On the one hand, in defining 
“indirect power” as the capacity of a person to transform social contexts, Hay 
overlooks the structural pre-conditions for such an exercise of power; for by virtue of 
what, we may ask, does the person have this capacity? Is this capacity a natural 
property or is it a social property of the person concerned? To the extent, then, that 
Hay overlooks the structural pre-conditions for the exercise of human agency (in the 
sense that one must draw on pre-existing rules and resources in order to act), he 
appears to be working with a latent, voluntaristic conception of social structure, in 
which social structure becomes the intentional creation of the exercise of human 
agency. On the other hand Hay overlooks the agential pre-conditions for the 
reproduction of power relations, arguing that “indirect” power is “mediated by, and 
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instantiated in, structures.” Now, this is to reify social structure for, once the new set 
of rules has been “instantiated in statute,” it becomes coercive of human agency–that 
is, it sets a limit to the “parameters” of action from which the agent can choose and 
thereby precludes the possibility of the agent choosing an action outside them (pp. 
50–51). In short, the second point I want to make is that conflating a voluntaristic 
conception of social structure with a deterministic conception of human agency 
leaves us confused about the source of human agents’ power; for, if we conceive of 
power either as a natural property of the human agent or as something external to, 
and so existing apart from, human agency, we will find it difficult to understand how 
we might transform unequal power relations.  
 If political scientists’ conceptions of power can be misleading as to the 
existence and source of power, they can also be misleading as to the nature of 
power. Let us return to Hay’s redefinition of power to see how this can happen. Hay 
(1997) claims that his conception of power as “context-shaping” can sustain both a 
“positive” conception of power–“power of”–and a “negative” conception of power–
“power over” (p. 50). Now, to identify a power relation as “negative,” such that it 
involves the domination and control of one person by another, is to make an implicit 
evaluation of that power relation: it is to imply that to be dominated is not in one’s 
best interests. In other words, a conception of “power over,” as Hay defines it, 
presupposes that power has an ethical dimension or aspect. However, it is this 
dimension that Hay wants to remove from the analysis of power. In Hay’s view, 
the identification of a power relationship … does not imply that the 
political analyst first engage in ethical judgements about the legitimacy 
of the conduct of those involved … Ethical and normative judgements 
can thus be suspended temporarily while the analysis and identification 
of power takes place. (Hay, 1997, p. 51) 
But, although the ethical is a distinct aspect of social structure and thus of power 
relations, because power relations are embodied in social structure, as I argue 
below, and because social structures are inherently value-laden, it does not exist 
apart from social structure. Hence, when it comes to identifying and classifying power 
relations in the social realm, “ethical and normative judgements” are necessarily 
involved, even if they are made only implicitly.9 In short, Hay’s reconceptualization of 
power is also philosophically problematic, to the extent that it reflects, implicitly, the 
contradictory effects of an empiricist way of thinking on the one hand, which 
underpins the separation of facts from values, and a critical naturalist way of thinking 
on the other, which acknowledges that facts are value-laden, resulting in ambiguity 
over the relationship between “power of” and “power over.”10 
 The importance of value judgements to the identification of types of power 
relation in the social realm–the third point of this section–takes me to my fourth and 
final point, about the nature of interests.11 We need to re-consider the concept of 
interests because there appears to be a consensus emerging among those political 
14 
 
This is the accepted version of the following article: Holland, D. (2015) ‘The Nature of the 
Political Reconsidered’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, doi: 10.1111/jtsb.12095, 
which has been published in final form at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jtsb.12095/abstract 
 
scientists who have reflected on the nature of power that, when analyzing power 
relations, we must not decide what is in the best interests of the parties involved 
because to do so is unjustifiable. As Hay (1997) puts it, to make a judgement about 
what is in a person’s best interests is to become “the supreme arbiter of the genuine 
interests of the ‘victim’” and, thereby, to engage in a “politically offensive” act of 
condescension (pp. 47–48). Doyle (1998) appears to agree with Hay when he states 
that “Hay is right to argue that Lukes must avoid making a value judgement in the 
sense of imputing or ascribing the interests of the affected party” (p. 54).  
 In defending the inevitability of making value judgements when identifying 
power relations in the social realm, then, we would seem to be opening ourselves up 
to the charge of vanguardism in claiming to be in a position to know what is in the 
best interests of those parties in the subordinate position of a relation of domination. 
However, in making a judgement about what is in a person’s best interests we are 
not “imputing or inscribing the interests of the affected party” as Doyle claims; on the 
contrary, we are evaluating a person’s perception of what is in their best interests–
that is, their understanding of what their real interests are. Agents’ perceived 
interests, in other words, may not be the same as their real interests. To assume that 
they are always the same would be to assume that agents have an infallible 
understanding of reality. (This, of course, is the presupposition of those 
epistemological positions, such as empiricism and constructivism, which commit the 
epistemic–ontic fallacy.) As social scientists we can help people to understand what 
their real interests are through critique of their falsely perceived interests–that is, by 
taking other people’s perceptions about what is in their best interests as the 
intransitive object of a social scientific inquiry. 
 Therefore, contrary to what Hay and Doyle claim, it would not be 
condescending for a social scientist to pass judgement on the veracity of the beliefs 
about reality which inform human agents’ choices of action; for to shut the door on 
the possibility of critique is to deny the very raison d’être of the social scientist, which 
is to transform common-sense beliefs about reality into theories that attempt to 
express, albeit fallibly, the truth of reality. It is only through critique that social 
scientists can help lay agents to understand that, because certain courses of action 
do not help them to meet their needs, these courses of action are not in their best 
interests. Therefore, to claim that people can be falsely conscious of their conditions 
of existence and, by implication, that they can develop false perceptions of what is in 
their best interests, is to say, quite simply, that their understanding of reality is 
mistaken. In other words, “false consciousness” is not the “spectre” of “contemporary 
social and political theory” (Hay, 1997, p. 47); rather, it is the very condition for a 
critical, and thus emancipatory, social science. 
 Furthermore, if consciousness is contradictory, power can still be exercised 
and actualized where conflict has yet to be expressed; for, if those in a subordinate 
position in society have grown up with, and so developed, an understanding of social 
reality that is sufficiently inadequate, they will not be able to work out what is in their 
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best interests. Therefore, to propose, as Doyle (1998) does, that we identify a power 
relation by looking for acts of conflict and their resolution–however far back in the 
past–is to assume that the parties to the conflict started off with a perfect 
understanding of social reality such that they were able to determine, accurately, 
which courses of action were in their best interests. In short, what my conception of 
interests and consciousness suggests is that the process of securing compliance in a 
society characterized by the unequal distribution of power is a much more subtle and 
complex process than Lukes, Hay, and Doyle have realized.  
 
THE POLITICAL AS FUNCTION AND ASPECT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Having identified philosophical problems in contemporary arguments about the 
nature of politics and power, I now want to set out a conception of the political which 
is fully consistent with the principles of critical realism, which avoids both the 
circularity of reasoning characteristic of the debate about the nature of politics and 
the confusion about the existence, source, and nature of power relations in the social 
realm, and which, thereby, is a coherent basis on which to define both power and 
politics and their inter-relationship. 
 What, then, is a conception of the political that is consistent with the principles 
of dialectical critical realism? Because this is a question of political philosophical 
ontology–that is, it is concerned with what all the objects that political scientists study 
have in common–we need to start by answering a question of political scientific 
ontology–that is, with a question about what exactly are the fundamental entities 
comprising the domain of the political. In other words, we need to think about the 
nature of power and of politics and from these reflections develop a conception of the 
political using transcendental reasoning. Let me start with power. As I have already 
indicated, if power is to be rendered consistent with the principles of critical realism, it 
must be conceived as a real, yet non-actual, and non-observable object of political 
scientific inquiry that is inherently value-laden. What this means is that power must 
be conceived as a property of social structure: it must be conceived as being 
embodied in social structure and as taking effect via the exercise of human agency, 
for it is through the effects of its exercise that we acquire knowledge of power. This 
does not mean that power exists within two separate entities–social structure on the 
one hand and human agency on the other–for social structure and human agency 
are ontologically interdependent; what it means is that social power relations endure 
by virtue of the internal relations between positions occupied by people.  
 Now, to say that power is a social structural property is to say that power 
modifies human agency so that, when people occupy positions in social structures, 
they are able to act in ways they would not otherwise be able to do. People who 
possess such powers, though, often think of them as rights: for example, the right of 
the employer to demand obedience from, and to dismiss, the employee (in certain 
circumstances) and the right of the landlord to demand payment of rent from the 
tenant and to evict the tenant from the property (in certain circumstances). However, 
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power is not the only type of social structural property; for, when people occupy 
positions in social structures, they also acquire liabilities, which they often think of as 
duties or obligations: for example, the employer’s duty of care towards the employee 
and the landlord’s duty of care towards the tenant. Indeed, what is experienced as a 
right by one party to a relation may often be experienced as a liability by the other. 
For example, an employer in the UK has an obligation to pay an employee a wage 
equivalent to at least the current value of the National Minimum Wage; should the 
employer fail to meet this obligation, the employee has the right to demand that the 
employer pay arrears by virtue of the contract of employment that exists between 
them.  
 Whether they are explicitly or implicitly understood, powers and liabilities are 
the pre-existing conditions of our social life: powers enable us to act, while liabilities 
constrain how we act. Often it is through misusing the powers available to us and 
through failing to meet our liabilities–whether this is intentional or unintentional–that 
we discover their enduring reality; and it is though our experiences of not being able 
to meet our needs when we exercise our rights and fulfil our obligations that we tend 
to become aware of the unequal distribution of powers and liabilities in society. To 
return to the example of employment, our experiences of participating in different 
types of employment may well alert us to the differences that exist in terms and 
conditions of employment and thus to differences in the nature of the powers 
possessed by employers. Perhaps, under a contract of permanent employment, 
when we are earning a regular salary and may be dismissed only in certain, very 
limited circumstances, we may feel secure enough materially to plan for the future; 
but, under a temporary contract with variable hours of work, when we are earning an 
irregular salary and may be dismissed for whatever reason our employer thinks fit, 
we may feel considerably less secure materially and so less able to make plans for 
the future. In other words, the relative lack of security that we may experience across 
different contexts of employment is an indicator of the relative dominance of the 
employer over the employee. 
 However, the extent to which we can understand why we cannot meet our 
needs, given the social contexts we are thrown into, will depend, amongst other 
things, on how we understand the nature of those contexts; for, to the extent that we 
think of society as constituted only by individuals and the effects of their actions and, 
thereby, reduce (implicitly) powers to their exercise and liabilities to their fulfilment, 
we will misunderstand the true extent, source, and nature of power relations which 
we must negotiate. In other words, if we take for granted a behaviouralist conception 
of power, we will tend to identify the existence of power only with situations in which 
conflict is revealed, and overlook situations in which power is being exercised (and 
actualized) but in which conflict is not expressed because those over whom power is 
being exercised do not understand the full extent to which they are in a position of 
subordination. Moreover, even if we do understand that our lives are structured, if we 
conflate social structure and human agency, we will find it very difficult once again to 
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understand how we might change social reality if we wanted to; for, if we believe that 
social structures are simply mental constructs and human agency is unconstrained, 
we will believe that we can change social contexts simply by changing how we think. 
However, changing the way we think is not enough to change social reality: we also 
have to change our material practices. Hence, if our attempts to think differently run 
up against the grain of pre-existing material practices, we may jump from a 
voluntaristic conception of social structure to a deterministic conception of human 
agency, and conclude that social change is impossible. The crucial point, though, is 
that our failure to locate, correctly, the source of social power helps to perpetuate the 
status quo, which may be characterized by inequalities of power and liability and 
which we may want to change. Believing that powers and liabilities are somehow 
value-free will only compound this problem because, if we misidentify power in the 
social realm with power in the natural realm, we will lose a conception of “power over” 
and become stuck with a conception of “power to” that we will see as natural and so 
unchangeable.  
 The upshot of the preceding discussion is that both power and liability are 
suitable objects of inquiry for political scientists because both are properties of social 
structure that take effect via the exercise of human agency. However, what sort of 
conception of the political is presupposed by a focus on the powers and liabilities of 
social structure? Some political scientists have designated the political an “aspect” or 
“moment” of the social. Hay (2002), for example, argues that 
Though all social relations may also be political relations, this does not 
imply that they are only political relations, nor that they can adequately 
be understood in such terms…. The political is … best seen as an 
aspect or moment of the social, articulated with other moments (such as 
the economic or cultural). Though politics may be everywhere, nothing 
is exhaustively political. (p. 75) 
I suggest that, in treating the political as an “aspect or moment of the social” Hay is 
trading implicitly on a transcendental realist conception of the political–that is, he is 
conceiving of the political as something that is non-empirical and non-actual yet still 
real. However, Hay’s conclusion that “all social relations may also be political 
relations” suggests that the transcendental realist element in his thinking is being 
distorted by the effect of a constructivist way of thinking, for to claim that “all social 
relations may also be political relations” is to reduce social relations to internally-
related meanings, the presupposition of a social constructivist epistemology. 
Furthermore, and by implication, it is to reduce natural necessity to conceptual 
necessity, and thus to deny the reality of emergence in the social realm and hence 
the existence of materially-embedded social structures. In short, from a social 
constructivist perspective what is political about a social relation is purely something 
that is constructed in thought. By contrast, from a transcendental realist perspective 
what is political about a social relation is that it is constituted by causal powers and 
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liabilities and thus by natural necessity. Because social relations constituted by 
causal powers and liabilities are internal social relations, one cannot then conclude 
from this perspective that “all social relations may also be political relations”; from a 
transcendental realist perspective, although social reality embraces both internal and 
external social relations, such that the former constellationally contain the latter, it is 
only from internal social relations that social structure, and thus a political “aspect,” 
emerges.  
 The consequence for Hay of tacitly accepting a constructivist definition of the 
political is that he is unable to rebut Heywood’s claim that to expand the definition of 
politics and the political “to include all social institutions” is to define “everything as 
politics” (Heywood, 1994, pp. 25–26, as cited in Hay, 2002, p. 74). Hay (2002) 
responds to this claim by arguing that the characterization of “all social relations” as 
political need entail neither seeing “politics everywhere” nor that describing and 
analyzing social relations “in political terms” is sufficient (pp. 74–75). Yet, this 
response makes sense only if the social relations to be analysed are internal 
relations since external social relations, as I have just argued, are not social 
structures. If the political is to be described as an aspect of social reality, therefore, 
this description must be applied only to internally-related social positions–that is, only 
to social structures.12 It follows that a conception of the political as an aspect of social 
structure is what is presupposed by a focus on the powers and liabilities of social 
structure; this is the transcendental realist basis of the process-based definition of 
politics described above. However, I suggest that a conception of the political as a 
function of social structure is the transcendental realist basis of the arena-based 
definition; for the significance of the arena-based definition is that it points to the 
existence of a particular set of social structures–those of government–whose powers 
(and liabilities) when in exercise have consequences that are binding throughout 
society. This is why the practices made possible by virtue of the existence of such 
structures–such as “making and implementing public policy”–are often described as 
having a formal, public character. The crucial point, though, is that it is by virtue of 
the existence of the structures of government that governing officials have the power 
to pass new laws and to bring them into effect. In other words, it is because 
governing officials have the power to change powers and liabilities embodied in other 
social structures–such as employment and marriage–that we may say that the 
structures of government have a political function. Of course, none of this is to deny 
that such structures, qua social structures, also have a political aspect. 
 We may say, therefore, that the study of the political as an aspect of social 
structure is the study of human agency as it is modified by social structure, because 
it is only through occupying positions in social structures that people acquire powers 
and liabilities that they would not otherwise acquire; and that the study of the political 
as a function of social structure is the study of social structure as it is modified by the 
exercise of human agency, because it is only through human agents exercising their 
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power to govern that powers and liabilities pertaining to other social structures can be 
changed.  
 What sort of conception of politics is entailed by a conception of the political as 
both an aspect and function of social structure? I suggest that a conception of the 
political as an aspect and function of social structure justifies a conception of politics 
as, on the one hand, the expression through human activity of the modification of 
human agency by social structure and, on the other hand, the reproduction and 
transformation of social structure through the exercise of human agency.13 The 
advantage of the former conception of politics is that it retains a focus on the ongoing 
exercise of human agency, which is the valid insight of the arena- and process-based 
definitions of politics, yet avoids the problem of actualism by locating the essence of 
the political in social structure. It thereby reminds us that social structure is the pre-
existing condition for the exercise of human agency, while allowing us to 
accommodate all the different activities that political scientists have hitherto selected 
as indicators of politics without falling into the trap of circular reasoning. The 
advantage of the latter conception of politics is that it reminds us that social 
structures would not exist without human agency and, therefore, that it is only 
through the exercise of human agency that social structures are either reproduced or 
transformed.  
 Moreover, I suggest that the extent to which social structures are either 
reproduced or transformed will depend, ceteris paribus, on the nature of the 
modification of human agency by social structure–that is, the extent to which social 
structures prevent human agents from meeting their needs–and on the 
understanding of social reality that human agents develop when they occupy 
positions in social structures. For example, if politics is purely conservative in its 
axiology, so that it is oriented to the preservation of the status quo, existing social 
structures will be reproduced.14 However, although they will be reproduced, the 
moment of reproduction will still be accompanied by a moment of transformation–
what I call transformation1–because the exercise of human agency always involves 
the absenting of some kind of absence, such as a gap in our knowledge of reality. 
What is characteristic of transformation1, therefore, is that it absents an absence, and, 
thereby, transforms reality, but leaves the particular types of structure that made this 
transformation possible unchanged. As I have already indicated, normally we do not 
think of this type of agency as being an expression of politics because the type of 
transformation involved–the intentional production (in this example, of knowledge)–
presupposes the (typically) unintentional reproduction of pre-existing social 
conditions (in this example, of knowledge production). However, not to recognize this 
situation as political would be to assume, implicitly, that underlying relations of power 
and liability, which, as I have argued, are constitutive of social structures, do not 
exist. Yet, it is just such an understanding that is equally essential to what I call 
transformation2, which, like transformation1, involves the absenting of an absence, but 
in which the absence to be absented is the absence of a social structure that is 
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wanted, precisely because it is conducive to the realization of human needs, and in 
which the presence of a structure constituted by unequal and oppressive relations of 
power and liability is unwanted, precisely because it is an obstacle to the realization 
of human needs and thus to human emancipation. By replacing an unwanted with a 
wanted structure human agents engage in emancipatory politics. 
 Note that transformation2 constellationally embraces transformation1, in the 
sense that transformation2 is a transformation of both the social and natural 
conditions for the exercise of human agency, whereas transformation1 is the 
transformation of just the natural conditions. This distinction helps us to make sense 
of Bhaskar’s claim that “no transformation is total and all reproduction is 
transformation” (2009, p. 152). For example, if the intentional production of wanted 
goods and services through transactions with nature (transformation1) is 
simultaneous with the unintentional reproduction of capitalist relations of production, 
reproduction and transformation will be distinct aspects of the same process rather 
than separate–that is, mutually exclusive–processes. However, if all reproduction is 
transformation, it is not the case that all transformation is reproduction because 
transformation2 entails the transformation not only of natural but also of social 
structures. For example, it is through the transformation of pre-existing capitalist 
relations of production that socialist relations of production become the intentional 
product of the human agent, just as much as the production of needed goods and 
services, which socialist relations of production make possible, is intentional. 
 However, to the extent that intentional production is informed by a lack of 
understanding of the properties of social and natural objects, it will have unintended 
consequences. For example, failure to understand that the structure of gender is 
internally related to the structures of capitalism would render futile any attempt to 
eradicate patriarchy and sexism that did not also attempt to eradicate the structures 
of capitalism. Equally, failure to understand that the structure of gender is an 
objective social relationship, so that it cannot be understood as nothing more than 
the interaction of individual men and women, would render futile any attempt to 
overcome the oppression of women through the instigation of a war of women 
against men. In both cases it is the misunderstanding of the nature of social reality 
that undermines the initial intention to overcome the oppression of women, leading, 
at best, to an “alteration or amelioration of states of affairs” (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 171) 
as causes become confused with their effects and are left untransformed.15 
 Therefore, I suggest that it is the fallibility of our knowledge of reality that 
licenses Bhaskar’s claim that “no transformation is total.” It follows that the 
emancipation of human agents’ understanding from distorted–that is, ideological–
ways of thinking is a necessary condition for their emancipation from oppressive 
social relations. However, whether or not this will be a sufficient condition will 
depend, ceteris paribus, on the scale of the oppression–that is, the number of people 
who occupy a subordinate position in social structures. For example, given the global 
scale of contemporary capitalist relations of production any attempt to eradicate 
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these would require not simply a change in mass consciousness but also a mass 
engagement in the practices of politics. By contrast a conservative form of politics 
would require neither a change in mass consciousness nor a mass engagement. In 
short, transformation1 and transformation2 are two different types of human agency 
which become possibilities in different social conditions.16 
 One further advantage of conceiving of the political as an aspect and function 
of social structure is that it opens the way to understanding how the political is both 
distinct from, yet at the same time connected to, other objects of social scientific 
inquiry. As I have just argued, what distinguishes the political as an object of social 
scientific inquiry is that it refers, on the one hand, to the modification of human 
agency by social structure and, on the other hand, to the reproduction and 
transformation of social structure through the exercise of human agency, whether 
one is considering the political either as a function or as an aspect of social structure. 
By contrast, what distinguishes the economic as an object of social scientific inquiry 
is that it refers to the material basis of social life.17 For example, we may say that 
social structures have an economic function, to the extent that the effect of their 
powers and liabilities is to bring about a change in the use of material resources–for 
example, the transformation of raw materials into finished goods (via relations of 
production) and the distribution of those goods to new owners (via relations of 
exchange); and we may say that, although such structures have an economic 
function, as materially embedded structures embodying powers and liabilities they 
also have an economic and a political aspect. For example, the relation between 
capitalist and wage-labourer, although functionally economic, has a political aspect, 
by virtue of the existence of distinctive powers and liabilities pertaining to the roles of 
capitalist and wage-labourer, and an economic aspect, in the sense that both 
capitalist and wage-labourer must consume some of what is produced, if they are to 
survive. Similarly, although the structures of government are functionally political, 
they have an economic aspect, in the sense that those who govern must consume 
some of the economic surplus, if they are to survive, and a political aspect, in the 
sense that those who govern have a distinctive set of powers available to them, as 
well as being bound by a distinctive set of liabilities. In short, the different functions 
and aspects of social structures are ontologically interdependent–that is, they come 
into existence within the same domain of reality rather than constituting distinct, 
emergent domains.  
 However, individual social structures may also be related causally, in the 
sense that their different functions may be interdependent. For example, if it is 
through the structures of government that laws are made, implemented, and 
enforced, the potential exercise of the powers and liabilities pertaining to the 
structures of (capitalist) employment will depend, amongst other things, on the 
successful exercise of the powers and liabilities pertaining to the structures of 
government. In other words, the possibility of transforming and distributing material 
resources under capitalism–an economic function–will depend, amongst other things, 
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on government officials making, implementing, and enforcing laws successfully–a 
political function. Equally, if it is the case that it is through the exercise of powers and 
liabilities pertaining to the structures of (capitalist) production that wealth is 
generated–an economic function–the successful exercise of the power available to 
government officials to raise revenue for the public purse through taxation–a political 
function–will depend, amongst other things, on the successful exercise of the powers 
available to capitalists to generate wealth. In short, we may say that the political 
function of the structures of government and the economic function of the (capitalist) 
structures of production are causally interdependent. The modes of differentiation 
and interconnection of the social structures of government and production are 
displayed in summary form in Table 1. 
 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
 Through the concepts of function and aspect of social structure, and 
ontological and causal interdependence, we can start to understand the nature of the 
relationship between the political and the economic, and hence the nature of the 
relationship between the fields of politics and economics. Indeed, the implication of 
my argument is that both specialization and integration in social scientific inquiry are 
justified; that is, it is by virtue of the nature of the political and the economic that 
distinct fields of political and economic inquiry are needed, just as much as the hybrid 
field of inquiry of political economy. In this respect Leftwich (2004b) is indeed right to 
acknowledge the need for political scientists “to open up the disciplinary frontiers to a 
much fuller and freer interdisciplinary movement of evidence and explanation” (p. 
117). As my argument shows, this need not be at the expense of establishing a 
coherent identity for those who study politics professionally.  
 
CONCLUSION 
My objective in this article was to re-examine, critically, debates within political 
science about the nature of politics and of power. I have argued that these debates 
will continue to be problematic for as long as the protagonists continue to take for 
granted an actualist conception of the political, and that this implicit ontological 
commitment is generated by an empiricist way of thinking on the one hand and a 
constructivist way of thinking on the other. I have argued that it is possible to resolve 
these problems by re-defining politics, power, and the political on the basis of a 
dialectical critical realist ontology in such a way that the new definitions incorporate 
the valid insights of the old–that politics may be expressed through different types of 
human activity–but sublate them; as such my re-definitions of politics, power, and the 
political build on the work of other social theorists in a critical way. Hence, the 
incorporation of the insights of existing reflections should not be understood as an 
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eclectic combination; rather, it should be understood either as a critical, expansionary 
synthesis or as a “non-preservative dialectical sublation” (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 12). In 
short, my re-definitions of politics, power, and the political retain what is of value in 
the old definitions yet not essential to the new ones.  
 However, if inclusivity is one of the characteristics of a dialectical critical realist 
approach to ontological theorising, necessity and inexorability are others; for making 
ontological commitments in social science is unavoidable, and, if ontological 
positions may be contradictory and implicitly understood, it is only through reflecting 
on questions of ontology that such positions may be rendered explicit and any 
contradictions resolved. Indeed, as I hope to have demonstrated, through reflecting 
on questions of political ontology directly, we can clarify the boundaries of the domain 
of political inquiry and, thereby, offer those who study politics professionally a clear 
identity.   
 I have argued throughout that it is political scientists’ continuing commitment 
to an actualist ontology that has prevented them from developing the transcendental 
realist conception of power latent within their reflections on the nature of politics and 
of power and that, in consequence, has made it difficult for them to reach agreement 
on questions of political (scientific) ontology. If political scientists are prepared to 
accept my transformed conceptions of the politics, power, and the political, therefore, 
they need not “celebrate diversity” in political science (Stoker and Marsh, 2010, p. 1); 
for the danger with indulging in such a celebration is that the persistence of lack of 
agreement and philosophical incoherence will make it difficult for political scientists to 
justify the continuing existence of political science as a distinct, publicly-funded 
discipline, a danger that has become all the more significant recently with the 
emergence of “economics imperialism” (Fine and Milonakis, 2009, p. 1). The 
persistence of lack of agreement and philosophical incoherence will also make it 
difficult for political scientists to engage in integrative, interdisciplinary research and 
for them to understand the existence, source, and nature of power in the social 
realm, which is essential if political science is to be emancipatory. However, to call 
into question the desirability of celebrating diversity in political science is not to argue 
against theoretical pluralism at a social scientific level; it is just to warn that 
celebrating theoretical pluralism at a philosophical level has its dangers.18  
 Finally, questions about the existence, source, and nature of power in the 
social realm apply to political science as a discipline; for, if the activities in which 
political scientists engage are governed by social and intellectual structures, these 
activities will be expressions of the modification of human agency by social and 
intellectual structures on the one hand and the reproduction and transformation of 
social and intellectual structures through the exercise of human agency on the other. 
If the distribution of powers and liabilities across the positions in these structures is 
unequal, we should not be surprised if we find that some forms of political science 
dominate others.19 Perhaps it is time, therefore, for political scientists–indeed, all 
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social scientists–to examine the politics of their profession and the relations of power 
and liability embedded within it. 
 
NOTES 
1. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for providing constructive 
comments on an earlier version of this article. 
2. I follow Bhaskar’s definition of explanatory critique. See Bhaskar, 2009, pp. 
177–180. On the difference between immanent and explanatory critique see the 
entry “critique” in Hartwig, 2007, pp. 105–108.  
3. By actualist ontology I mean the assumption that reality consists only of 
events and states of affairs. Such an assumption presupposes that underlying 
structures can be reduced to the events and states of affairs that their mechanisms 
generate, and, thereby, denies the necessary and the possible. For example, the rate 
of profit of a capitalist system of production and appropriation will fall over the long 
run, ceteris paribus, by virtue of natural necessity–that is, the causal powers and 
liabilities constitutive of such a system. However, because other things are not 
always equal–that is, because other factors (such as an increase in the supply of 
cheap labour power) may counteract the effect of the factors causing the rate of profit 
to fall–a reduction in the rate of profit is only a possibility; whether or not the rate of 
profit does fall depends on the prevailing social conditions. Hence, the effects of 
causal powers and liabilities may not be actualized. This is why Marx refers to the 
falling rate of profit as a tendency, since this term embraces the reality of both natural 
necessity and possibility. For other forms of actualism see Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 234–
235. 
4. I discuss the stratification and differentiation of reality in greater depth in 
Holland, 2013, Ch. 2. 
5. The two fallacies are usually referred to together as the epistemic-ontic fallacy 
because they presuppose one another; and they presuppose one another because 
they constitute a type of “identity theory” (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 399). 
6. In referring to the concepts of intentionality and reflexivity I am drawing on the 
work of Archer (2003). 
7. When I say that Peters “is referring, implicitly, to a feature of social reality that 
is not given immediately in experience,” I am saying that Peters understands that a 
relation of power is something that is non-empirical, non-actual, yet real but that he is 
unable to express this understanding in discourse; in other words, he knows what is 
wrong with trying to define politics actualistically but is unable to say much about why 
this is wrong. In making this critique Peters is drawing on tacit knowledge of social 
reality. However, the causal effect of this tacit (philosophical) knowledge is only a 
tendency because, as I have argued, he also draws on a tacit understanding of the 
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8. Collier makes the same mistake when discussing Bhaskar’s differentiation of 
power relations into “‘power1’” and “‘power2’” (2007, p. 112), as Morgan (2007) argues 
in his response to Collier’s intervention. 
9. It is precisely for this reason that Bhaskar (2008) distinguishes between 
“power1 … the transformative capacity intrinsic to the concept of action as such” and 
“power2 … the capacity to get one’s way against either the overt wishes and/or the 
real interests of others in virtue of structures of exploitation, domination, subjugation 
and control, i.e. generalized master–slave-type relations” (p. 402). 
10. For a definition of critical naturalism see Hartwig, 2007, pp. 91–96. The 
ambiguity in Hay’s thinking is evident in statements such as this: “To suggest that A 
exercises power over B is to make no claim, within this schema, about the subversion 
or violation of B’s ‘true interests’ (though such a claim is clearly not precluded by 
such a statement)” (Hay, 1997, p. 51). To argue that making a value judgement is not 
precluded by the identification of a power relation as one of “power over” is to admit, 
tacitly, that the identification of such a relation presupposes the making of a value 
judgement. Hay cannot then claim, at the same time, that the identification of “power 
over” does not involve making a value judgement. 
11. Following Bhaskar (2009), I define interests as “anything conducive to the 
achievement of agents’ wants, needs and/or purposes” (p. 170).  
12. From the perspective of transcendental realism only internally-related social 
positions are social structures because it is only through internal relations between 
entities (the parts) that a new, higher-order entity (the whole) emerges. In the social 
realm the lower-order entities are positions, such as employer and employee, which 
human agents occupy; and it is from internal relations between these positions that a 
higher-order entity, in this case the social structure of employment, emerges. As 
emergent entities, social structures possess distinctive properties which modify–that 
is, both constrain and enable–the exercise of human agency. Hence, in explanations 
of concrete phenomena the properties of social structures–that is, causal powers and 
liabilities–should not be reduced to the properties of people, such as intentionality 
and reflexivity, through which the causal effect of social structure is mediated.  
13. Here I am drawing on the insights of Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of 
Social Activity on which see Bhaskar 2009, pp. 122–129 and 2008, pp. 152–158. 
14. For a definition of axiology see Hartwig, 2007, pp. 47–49.  
15. This is the classic failing of reformism. 
16. Note that what I am calling transformation2 is synonymous with what Bhaskar 
(2008) calls “transformed … transformative … totalizing … transformist … praxis” (p. 
120). It is “transformed” because it depends on the transformation of understanding 
of what is real and thus of what it is possible for human agents to transform; 
“transformative” because it involves transforming something other than human 
agency–that is, constraints on the exercise of human agency; “totalizing” because in 
attempting to transform the conditions for the exercise of human agency the agent 
engages in meta-reflexivity–that is, becomes reflexive about the understanding of 
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reality developed through engaging in reflexivity–where reflexivity is “the inwardised 
form of totality” (p. 403); and “transformist”, as opposed to reformist, because it is 
“oriented to structural change” and “informed by explanatory critique, concrete 
utopianism and participatory–animating/activating research” (p. 120). Therefore, it is 
to the extent that human agency remains untransformed, nontransformative, 
nontotalizing, and nontransformist that politics will be conservative in its axiology. 
17. Here I am drawing on Lawson’s definition of economics as “the identification 
and study of the factors, and in particular social relations, governing those aspects of 
human action most closely connected to the production, distribution and use of 
wealth, along with the assessment of alternative really possible scenarios” (Lawson, 
2003, p. 152). 
18. Note that, by warning of the dangers of celebrating philosophical diversity, I 
am not implying that dominant philosophical traditions in the social sciences–most 
notably, positivism and interpretivism–should be banned somehow. As I see it, it is a 
question of how the intellectual (and social) conditions of knowledge production can 
be transformed. One of the implications of my argument is that such a transformation 
will only be possible if it is wanted by a sufficient number of social scientists and the 
general public. 
19. The nature and effects of the social and intellectual structures of knowledge 
production, in relation to the problem of integrating knowledge through 
interdisciplinary research, are discussed in Holland (2013). 
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